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Abstract 
This paper presents the objectives and architecture 
of the use case of secure wireless avionics intra-
communications of the European Project SCOTT 
(secure connected trustable things). SCOTT aims to 
build trust of the Internet of Things (IoT) in 
industrial applications. SCOTT addresses multiple 
issues such as security, safety, privacy, and 
dependability across 5 industrial domains: 
automotive, aeronautics, railway, building and 
healthcare. The aeronautics use case focuses on the 
application for active flow control (AFC) based on 
dense wireless sensor and actuator networks 
(DWSANs). Topics about security, vulnerabilities 
and safety in the general field of wireless avionics 
intra-communications (WAICs) will be addressed. 
The paper presents preliminary conclusions of the 
vulnerabilities and security solutions across 
different entities and layers of the aeronautics IoT 
architecture.  
Keywords: WAICs, security, vulnerability, IoT, 
Bubble. 
1   Introduction 
The number of wireless links is growing exponentially. It 
is estimated that nearly 25 billion devices will be online 
by 2020 [1]. A high percentage of these devices will use 
wireless links. Wireless is expanding to areas previously 
reluctant to this type of communication. In aeronautics, 
wireless is just recently gaining acceptance for on-board 
applications. This late adoption is due to reliability and 
interference issues. Wireless is starting to be used on 
board for systems that conventionally used only wireline 
infrastructure (i.e., as replacement of wires). It will also 
be used for applications which are now only possible 
thanks to the wireless component (e.g., indoor 
localization). Recent interference and reliability studies 
with state-of-the-art wireless standards (see [2]) suggest 
the feasibility of a relatively new research area called 
wireless avionics intra-communications (WAICS) [3]. 
Examples of potential applications of WAICs are: 
structure health monitoring, fuel tank sensors, automatic 
route control based on optimized fuel consumption and 
weather monitoring, automatic turbulence reduction or 
active flow control, flexible wiring redundancy design, 
logistics, and in-flight entertainment.  
The avionics industry will experience a wireless 
revolution in the years to come. The concept of “flyby-
wireless” [4] opens several issues in design, 
configuration, security, trustiness, and interference 
control. Wireless networks are inherently prone to 
security and privacy threats due to their broadcast nature. 
Eavesdropping by unintended parties on board or outside 
the airplane is one of the main issues, which requires 
appropriate encryption, coding and/or authentication 
schemes to be minimized. Man-in-the-middle (MiM) and 
denial of service (DoS) attacks can prevent sensor 
information about aircraft health from reaching the 
control cabin, thus posing a threat to the safety of the 
plane, leading to mal-functioning. Intentional and 
unintentional jamming can also increase the risk of failure 
and lack of communication in aircraft. All these 
vulnerabilities and risks need to be properly studied, so 
that potential countermeasures can be implemented. 
This paper deals with security in the domain of 
aeronautics of the European ECSEL project SCOTT 
(secure Connected Trustable Things) [5]. The aeronautics 
use case exploits the application of active flow control 
(AFC) using dense wireless sensor and actuator networks 
(DWSANs) to design secure communications across 
different layers and entities of the architecture. The 
objective is to increase the technology readiness level 
(TRL) of secure wireless solutions in the avionics 
industry.  
SCOTT is a project that aims to boost trust, security, 
safety, privacy and dependability of the Internet of things 
(IoT) in industrial applications. SCOTT envisions a 
trusted, industrial-compliant cloud connectivity for IoT, 
with high energy efficiency and autonomous operation. 
SCOTT uses the concept of Bubble from the predecessor 
project DEWI [6]. The Bubble is a high-level abstraction 
of an industrial WSAN with enhanced interoperability, 
dependability, standardized access to sensor readings, and 
cross-domain development [7]. SCOTT foresees an 
ecosystem of communicating bubbles in different 
industrial use cases. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the 
objectives of the aeronautics domain of the project. 
Section 3 presents the advances with respect to the state 
of the art.  Section 4 presents the application of active 
flow control and its architecture. Section 5 presents the 
physical entity model. Section 6 deals with the 
functionality model. Section 7 presents preliminary 
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vulnerability and security analysis. Section 8 presents the 
conclusions of the paper.  
2   Objectives and measurable indicators 
The objectives of the aeronautics domain (Figure1) are 
[5]:  
 Ensure that WAICs are secure, trustable and safe 
(reduce identified vulnerabilities and security threats 
in the project of wireless solutions by up to 90%).  
 Construct gateways between WAICs and the internal 
networks of commercial aircraft enforcing multi-level 
and multi-metric security, privacy and safety. 
 Increase fuel efficiency by replacing cables and using 
dense-WSANs for turbulence and skin drag control.  
 Conduct a study of vulnerabilities and potential 
attacks to the new hybrid wireless/wired avionics 
infrastructure. Propose countermeasures with a trade-
off analysis between complexity and risk.  
 Provide guidelines to stakeholders on how to solve 
common problems of security, privacy, and 
trustiness. 
 Help in the adoption of WAICs in industry (including 
standardization and certification issues).  
 Enable the use of semantics interoperable middleware 
tools for the development of advanced fleet 
management and smart avionics applications.  
The objectives in terms of measurable indicators are:  
 To create a repository of tools, reference 
implementations and links to middleware and 
reliability studies of avionics infrastructure. 
 Demonstrate secure wireless avionics applications 
covering different scenarios.  
 Development of gateways for avionics applications 
providing secure and trustable protocol translation.  
 Improve the performance of wireless avionics by a 
factor of 10 in terms of spectral efficiency, also to 
improving energy efficiency and interference 
reduction.  
 Demonstrate via a prototype, standardization and a 
reference implementation the reliability and trustiness 
of commercial wireless standards on board aircraft.  
 Provide guidelines to aerospace stakeholders on how 
to improve privacy and security in WAICs.   
 
 
Figure 1   Aeronautics objectives 
3   State of the art (SoA) and progress  
One major potential advantage of using wireless 
technology in aeronautics is the reduction of wiring, 
which is a critical issue in aircraft and spacecraft design 
[8]. Blackhawk helicopters carry almost 2,000 pounds of 
wires for computers and sensors [9]. Electrical wiring 
problems cause on average two inflight fires every month 
as well as more than 1077 mission aborts and over a 
hundred thousand lost mission hours per year [10]. Each 
year, navy spends one to two million man-hours finding 
and fixing wiring problems [11] . Damages on a wired 
connection can affect not only the system related to the 
faulty wire, but also contiguous systems which 
individually would have been fully operational. 
Therefore, the use of wireless technology is expected to 
bring considerable gains to the avionics industry in terms 
of reduction of cables, more flexibility in the design of 
redundancy links, and faster troubleshooting. Wireless 
nodes have also the advantage reaching places of an 
aircraft that cannot be reached by wires. Furthermore, 
modern WSNs provide self-configuration, RF tolerance, 
and maintenance troubleshooting that are much more 
flexible than their wireline counterparts. In critical 
avionics applications though, wireless links cannot 
completely replace wired links due to the high reliability 
requirement. However, they can replace redundant links, 
thus increasing reliability and flexibility in the design.  
In avionics, wireless technology is well known for several 
applications such as: air traffic management (ATM), 
telemetry, aircraft-ground control, satellite localization/ 
communication, identification of friend-or-foe systems, 
inter-aircraft communications, and radar. In contrast to 
these applications, which are relatively mature, WAICs 
have just recently gained attention.  Recent results suggest 
that existing standardized commercial wireless 
technologies show potential low levels of interference and 
thus low impact to on-board systems, as well as reliable 
performance compatible with existing wireline 
infrastructure. These results have paved the way for new 
applications for wireless communications in aircrafts.  
Security is an important issue in wireless avionics. In 
comparison with conventional WSNs, the data of an 
aircraft, particularly related to aircraft health monitoring, 
is vital for the good functioning, management and safety 
of a plane. Therefore, the sensor network should be more 
robust to different types of attacks either from passengers 
or entities on board, ground or even from other aircrafts. 
An extensive analysis of different types of security attacks 
using an adversary model, where the adversary can be 
internal or external and the attack can be passive or active 
are available in the literature. Safety and business threats 
have been identified such as: data integrity, authenticity, 
confidentiality, link-key establishment, channel jamming 
mitigation, secure routing, secure location verification, 
and robustness to node capture (eavesdropping)[12].  
SCOTT intends to leverage wireless technology in the 
aeronautical industry. This means to effectively 
implement secure and safe wireless technology in real 
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applications to be used by the aeronautics industry. The 
objective is to bring the concept of IoT to aeronautical 
applications thus creating a smart, flexible and automatic 
environment on board and in different elements of the 
aeronautics industry, including airports, management of 
infrastructure, flight control, vehicle-to-infrastructure 
and/or vehicle-to-vehicle communication, turbulence 
reduction, etc. The aeronautics domain will present a full 
analysis of vulnerabilities and potential countermeasures 
for the hybrid aircraft wireless/wireline infrastructure. 
SCOTT attempts to create a framework for smart avionics 
development with different levels of security and 
trustiness that will enable big data analytics and cloud 
computation for the optimization of aircraft performance, 
reduction of fuel consumption, controlled interference, 
and high spectral efficiency.  
Several issues will be addressed, including propagation 
modelling for reliable transmission and reduced leaking 
or interference, as well as MAC-PHY cross-layer design 
to reduce conflicts between different subnetworks in the 
same aircraft and minimize interference to control 
subsystems. Secure links will be addressed by minimizing 
transmissions to potential eavesdroppers or unsafe 
locations either within the same or in other airplanes. 
Privacy of data will be also addressed by convenient 
mechanisms and data-context management with ground 
control.  
The aeronautics industry expects huge benefits from the 
use of wireless technologies. It is estimated that cables 
constitute over 70% of aircraft weight. The use of 
wireless links could reduce this figure down to 55%. In 
addition, technologies such as AFC enabled by DWSANs 
can help reduce the effect of skin drag, thus further 
improving fuel consumption efficiency. A reduction of 
10% in fuel consumption is translated into several 
millions of dollars in savings. It is estimated that the use 
of wireless technologies will bring a 12% reduction in 
terms of fuel consumption [13].  Further improvements 
are possible when combined with other technologies such 
as winglets, carbon fibre fuselage and improved turbine 
design. The use of cables has one more benefit in terms of 
cabling planning tasks. It is estimated that these planning 
tasks have a cost of 2,200 dollars per kg of aircraft [14]. 
When considering two types of aircraft the estimated 
savings are the following [15]: A320/B737-900 6,400 kg 
x 2,200 $/kg ≈ $14 million, and A350-900/B787-9 23,000 
kg x 2,200$/kg ≈ $50,6 million.  It is also estimated that 
13% of an aircraft operation cost is related to 
maintenance, reparation and overhaul. Wireless 
technologies are expected to have a big impact in the 
reduction of these costs. Automatic configuration, 
maintenance and troubleshooting can be performed over 
the air reducing maintenance service costs.  
 4   Application case: Active Flow Control 
based on dense WSANs 
The objective of the Bubble AFC is to employ a wireless 
sensor-actuator and communication bubble for 
suppression of the turbulent flow and delaying the BL 
(boundary layer) transition. The sensor network will 
detect the low-pressure region on the upper wing surface. 
The position of BL transition zone will be defined, 
selecting the appropriate actuators to be activated. At the 
same time, and based on the sensor values, the set of 
conditions for operation of the actuators (e.g., frequency, 
amplitude) will be calculated based on existing data (pre-
set data). The selected actuators are activated to manage 
the turbulent flow on the wing surface. The data is stored. 
A new sensor reading is collected, and the cycle is 
repeated. The stored data can be analysed to assess system 
operation during, for example, different flight profiles or 
moments (e.g., take-off, landing, and cruise). Ground 
systems can interact with the sensor-actuator and 
communication bubble to get the data recorded during the 
flight and process this information to determine actuation 
plans and analyse the data of the whole fleet.  
There are several challenges in the interconnectivity and 
how to achieve the desired objective in a dependable 
manner, whilst minimizing energy expenditure. The 
WSAN requires sensor measurements at high frequency 
and in a synchronous manner, to be able to correlate 
sensor readings, especially from sensors in close 
proximity. The WSAN also needs deal with failures of 
sensors, and this can be approached by employing reliable 
data transmission and data delivery mechanisms and also 
by employing data processing strategies that can deal with 
sensor failures.  
It is important to boost the use of wireless communication 
systems on board to enable the deployment, as soon as 
possible, of technologies like Structural Health 
Monitoring (SHM) and Active Flow Control. To achieve 
this goal, these wireless networks and sensor systems 
need to communicate and interact with the main data 
buses of the aircraft. Hence, the specification of bi-
directional bridges between different types of 
technologies is required. This is still the case if wireless 
technologies are used as the main data bus of the aircraft. 
Different wireless networks, with different delivery 
deadlines and different underlying technologies must 
operate together without possibility of interference. 
Bridge protocols and interfaces must be specified 
considering the constraints of the different networks. 
The AFC system uses an architecture with a set of 
polygonal patches, each patch with a regular grid/array of 
sensors and actuators. These patches will be located 
mainly on surface of the wings of the aircraft, and 
potentially on other surfaces of the fuselage. The 
objective is to control the turbulence region across the 
aircraft and reduce losses. All the sensors and actuators 
inside a single patch will be wired together sharing a 
single communication and control point. The patches will 
communicate wirelessly with a relay or access point 
located conveniently in the aircraft to ensure good 
communication with several patches. Each patch will be 
enabled with some sort of intelligence to provide 
management of all the sensors and actuators inside the 
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patch and to provide convenient communication link with 
the sink and the control unit inside the Bubble. The 
architecture of AFC is therefore a hybrid of a wireless and 
wireline sensor network, which is the most convenient for 
this application. The information generated by each 
sensor will be collected by the control unit of each patch 
(node) which will provide some preliminary filtering, 
fusion and aggregation functionalities. The refined 
information will be then relayed towards the control unit 
(Gateway or relay node). Based on this collected 
information and based on different flight profiles, the 
AFC system will decide the type of actions to be 
performed by the set of actuators on each patch. Each of 
the flow control actuators is a piezoelectric device 
(synthetic jet actuator –SJA- or Fliperon). These actuators 
can delay the turbulence BL and thus help in 
counteracting the dragging effect in response to the 
measured information and according to flight profiles. 
The size and number of patches, as well as the number of 
sensors/actuators per patch is optimized using a simulator. 
These parameters are function of the accuracy of the 
active flow control system, the range of the wireless 
technology selected, and the data rate of the wireless 
sensor nodes. All sensor/actuators nodes will be powered 
via cables. The patch will be provided with some power 
saving features too. For example, when a sensor 
information or actuation is not required from some 
patches, they can be powered down until they need to be 
used again, thereby saving energy. 
The architecture proposed for the AFC system is 
relatively new in aeronautics, as it constitutes a hybrid 
design with wired and wireless components. The number 
of sensors for this application is expected to be large, 
more than in common WSNs, being deployed over a 
relatively small area. This brings up the issue of 
interference, if each sensor was to be enabled with an 
individual wireless connection. To solve this, our 
approach presents an architecture where groups of sensors 
wired together form a patch that will act as a single 
wireless transmitter. Each patch will be provided with 
smart self-configuration and control. Figure 2 shows the 
possible embodiment of a regular design of sensor and 
actuators inside a patch. Each patch will have a radio 
transceiver and a control unit with some intelligence. This 
node will be in charge of organizing the processing and 
operations inside the patch, as well as filtering, fusing, 
and aggregating data to be sent towards the wireless node. 
 
Figure 2   Patch concept for AFC 
 
Another aspect is the interconnection of WAICs into the 
avionics internal systems as shown in Figure 3. The 
proposed solution has to be able to pass reliably the traffic 
from/to the wireless sensor/actuator network to the 
internal avionics network under different QoS constraints. 
In general, the AFDX (Avionics Full-Duplex Switched 
Ethernet) network (or ARINC664) has more stringent 
QoS requirements, therefore the solution must include an 
appropriate scheduler that will ensure these QoS 
constraints of the AFDX traffic are met or conveniently 
addressed when transported to/from the wireless domain. 
4.1   Overview of the architecture 
The main physical entity of the SCOTT AFC system is a 
regular array of wired sensors and actuators also called 
patch. A possible configuration of this patch and an array 
of patches are shown in Figure 2. The patch can have 
hexagonal, rectangular or in general a polygonal shape, 
depending on the needs of coverage over the aircraft. The 
patch is mounted over the surface of the fuselage and 
mainly the wings of the aircraft, where turbulent flow is 
expected to be formed, particularly at high vehicle speeds 
and high values of angle of attack (AoA). We recall here 
that the objective of the dense SAN (sensor and actuator 
network) implemented by means of patches is to track the 
formation of turbulent flow and attempt to delay the 
separation of the boundary layer using actuation policies 
for different flight profiles or moments of an aircraft 
mission. All the sensors and actuators inside the patch are 
controlled by a master unit, which is in charge of intra-
patch management, signal relaying, data aggregation, data 
fusion, compression, and protocol conversion. The 
sensors and actuators can be connected using a real time 
technology that can have several characteristics or 
topologies. One potential configuration is using a 
microprocessor board controlling one subset of sensors 
and actuators inside the patch. A network of 
microprocessors is deployed inside the patch, with a real 
time transmission technology such as CAN (Controller 
Area Network) or ARINC 664. Intra-patch routing 
algorithms can be implemented to allow the information 
of different sensors to be collected reliably and in real 
time by the master unit. 
Each patch in the network has a wireless transmission unit 
that is used to communicate with a wireless gateway 
Sensor
Actuator
Figure 3   Interconnection with an aeronautical 
internal network (AFDX) 
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located conveniently in the aircraft to maximize coverage 
with a set of distributed patches (see high level 
architecture displayed in Figure 5). The patch is the basic 
unit of the proposed AFC system, as it provides 
modularity, scalability, flexible implementation, as well 
as advanced management and troubleshooting. Close loop 
operation occurs at three levels:  
1. Directly at the sensor and actuator microprocessor 
control level to deal with the fast (short term) and 
spatially correlated variations of the turbulent flow to 
be sensed. 
2. At the level of the internal aeronautics network (see 
Figure 3). A control unit for the network of patches 
resides in the internal control operation of the 
aircraft. The decisions of the medium-term 
turbulence statistics are taken directly in this close 
loop control unit on-board the aircraft.  
3. All the relevant measurements for different moments 
of an aircraft mission are relayed from the aircraft to 
ground control. Ground control contains a database 
of actuation policies that are optimized over different 
types of aircraft at different times of the year, routes 
and weather conditions. This level of control allows 
operators to optimize routes, as well as actuation 
policies based on big data analytics that will become 
more reliable over longer periods of time and with 
more data of sensor and actuation policies.  
5   Physical entity model 
Patch of sensors and actuators. The basic unit of the 
AFC system consists of a regular set of sensors and 
actuators that communicate with each other in a mesh 
array or in star formation with a master control unit. The 
intra-patch communication technology can be real-time or 
with high reliability to transport all the sensor readings to 
the master unit, as well as any actuation control policy 
back from the master unit to the actuators. Each patch has 
a wireless communication module that allows 
transmission with an access point or with other patches 
depending on the configuration. Patches are also allowed 
to relay the information of other patches towards the 
destination if necessary. The control unit can also process 
the sensor data across time and space inside the patch. 
Other functionalities of the patch include filtering, 
encoding, encryption, compression, etc. One potential 
configuration is using a microprocessor board controlling 
one subset of sensors and actuators inside the patch. A 
network of microprocessors is deployed inside the patch, 
with a real time transmission technology such as CAN 
(Controller Area Network) or ARINC 664.The intra patch 
communication technology can use secure routing to 
avoid malfunction or an attack.  
Wireless gateway or WAICs access point. This entity 
implements the PHY and MAC layer transmission and 
organisation of the WAICS radio technology for 
communication with patches. The gateway translates the 
wireless protocol to the internal wireline aeronautics 
network of commercial aircraft. This translation has 
several challenges due to the different nature of the 
unreliable and unsecure wireless world in comparison 
with the real-time internal avionics network. Part of the 
analysis is how to make secure this translation from the 
wireless domain to the wireline real-time operation of the 
commercial aircraft.  
Internal actuation policy control unit. This entity is in 
charge of the collection of the medium-term statistics of 
the collected flow information from the network of 
patches across the entire aircraft. Therefore, it can be used 
to calculate actuation policies that optimize the delaying 
of the BL separation for the whole airplane. In this 
problem it is evident that the whole performance and 
stability of the aircraft as well as aerodynamic efficiency, 
and monitoring of other stability issues of the airplane 
come into place. In addition, for security purposes it is 
possible to implement intrusion detection, misbehaviour 
tracking, redundancy coding, authentication of patches, 
authorisation of actuation policy control, etc. 
Ground operator and actuation policy database back 
end servers. This entity is in charge of the actuation 
control and optimisation across different aircraft. It is 
intended to provide airline operators with a means to 
control, analyse, collect and process sensor data of 
different routes and aircraft. This processing aims to 
obtain (using cloud computing tools, for example) 
optimised actuation policies according to the time of the 
year, route, type of aircraft, weather conditions, etc. In a 
generalized scenario, this entity provides consolidated 
access to sensor and actuation control information for 
wireless avionics applications. Several security 
mechanisms can be used in this external access to aircraft 
information such as authorization, authentication, 
encryption, tunnelling, intrusion detection, privacy 
labelling/control, etc.  
5.1 Aircraft architecture 
The aircraft comprises several systems with different 
functions defined to achieve several product goals (see 
Figure 4): 
1. Aircraft Control Domain (ACD): contains functions 
required to maintain the aircraft airworthy providing 
control to pilot or breathable environment to 
passengers. Any fail or malfunction jeopardizes the 
aircraft. 
2. Airline Information Services Domain (AISD): used 
by airline to operate the aircraft providing 
maintenance information and software and databases 
updates. 
3. Passenger Information and Entertainment Services 
Domain (PIESD): contains those functions used by 
passengers during the flight like games, internet 
connection and access to media. 
5.2 Layered model alignment 
This section provides the alignment of the physical entity 
model described in previous subsection with the layered 
overview of the SCOTT high level architecture. This 
layered model is closely correlated to the concept of 
272   The SCOTT Approach 
Volume 29, Number 4, December 2018 Ada User Journal 
SCOTT Bubble, which is the basic building block for 
interoperability and security enhancing for the project. 
This layered model consists of three levels (one of them 
optional) that define the intra and extra-bubble space as 
observed in Figure 5. Level 0 is the wireless domain to 
provide the last link between the fixed aeronautical 
infrastructure towards the distributed sensor or object 
nodes. In the active flow control use case, this wireless 
technology has actually a hybrid approach using wireline 
and wireless components under the name of patch. A 
patch is a wireline entity of sensors and actuators. Each 
patch uses wireless technology to communicate with the 
L0 or WSN gateway. The access point is placed on-board 
the aircraft therefore acting as the translation entity 
between the wireless domain and the internal network of 
the aircraft. This internal network of the aircraft acts as 
the L1 of the SCOTT reference architecture. Many other 
WAICs applications will use the same approach, 
particularly those in which the wireless link replaces an 
existing wireline sensor. In the case of the AFC use case, 
it is also plausible that L1 is completely independent of 
the internal network of the aircraft. However, for the sake 
of covering more generic implementations, it will be 
multiplexed inside this internal network, which in many 
current commercial aircraft is a real-time deterministic 
version of Ethernet technology. This integration into the 
L1 internal aircraft network, comes at the expense of 
traffic contention, possible attacks from other points 
inside the internal network, as well as attacks originated 
in the wireless network towards other aircraft internal 
subsystems. This means that the internal critical aircraft 
network can be subject of an attack coming from the 
wireless domain, which is a less secure environment. In 
the SCOTT reference architecture, L1 is an optional level, 
mainly because in some uses cases it is possible that this 
interaction with an existing domain network does not 
exist. The on-board unit acts as the Bubble Gateway, 
which controls all aspects of the intra-bubble space and 
provides translation for external user access. This is the 
boundary of the SCOTT Bubble in aeronautics. 
Finally, Level 2 of the reference architecture defines the 
extra bubble space. L2 is used for external access to the 
information of Nodes inside the aeronautical Bubble. This 
is the ground control operation network, where the 
external user is the airline operator or a smart avionics 
application collecting information from many different 
aeronautical Bubbles, inside the same aircraft or located 
in different aircraft or fleets.  The mapping of the 
aeronautical use case to this layered view of the 
architecture is shown in Figure 5. 
The Bubble is a concept that allows an integration of 
legacy WSN and local industrial domain technologies into 
a single point of entry towards the modern Internet cloud. 
The bubble Gateway can provide transparent access to the 
objects inside the Bubble, or simply to a summarized 
version of the information generated inside the Bubble. 
This concepts allows designers to exercise control over 
the access to the intra-bubble entities, and therefore 
enforce higher dependability different from the non-delay 
sensitive internet-like infrastructure (L2) and also higher 
security control. In the aeronautics industry, the use of a 
Bubble confined to one aircraft or sections of the aircraft 
is a powerful tool to avoid attacks from external entities, 
while also controlling the permissions granted to L1 
internal users. The attacks coming from the passenger 
entertainment system can also be handled by enabling the 
bubble gateway with convenient scheduling policies and 
out-of-band security communication, as well as 
autonomous operation. 
 
Figure 5: AFC use case architecture 
6   Functionality model 
The functionality model is derived explicitly from the 
reference architecture of the project. The explicit 
functional model for the AFC system is shown in Figure 
6, and the hybrid view functional versus layered entity 
model is shown in Figure 7.  Functional layers include: 
Device Layer (DL), Network Layer (NL), Service Layer 
(SL), IoT and Virtualization Layer (IOTL), Cloud and 
application Layer (CAL), and Service Layer Management 
(SLM) and Cross-Layer Management (CLM). 
Each of the physical entities will implement a slight 
variation of the functional model. The hardware layer in 
the patch unit focuses on the technology to interconnect 
sensors and actuators, intra-patch routing, management, 
compression, redundancy coding, encryption (optionally), 
authentication, intrusion detection, safe mode operation 
and troubleshooting. The intra-patch technology is real-
time and is used to collect the sensor measurements from 
the dense mesh of nodes in the master unit of each patch. 
There are no high-level functionalities here except in the 
master unit of each patch, which provides protocol 
translation to the wireless domain.  
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Figure 6  Functional entity layered model 
Figure 7  Mapping functional vs physical entity 
One candidate for intra-patch communication is the 
protocol TTP (Time Triggered protocol). In the wireless 
domain for inter-patch communication, several aspects of 
the functional model are here presented: MAC and PHY 
communication layers use MIMO (multiple-input 
multiple output), beamforming, MAC-PHY security, 
interference rejection, spatial-based authentication, 
collision resolution by retransmission diversity, multi-
packet reception, interference alignment, and 
dependability control. Optionally, encryption in this link 
will also be used based on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard. 
Intrusion detection, and safety hazards identification are 
also being investigated. Higher layer functionalities 
include secure routing, tunnelling, patch-authentication 
using key distribution algorithms, malware detection, and 
firewall protection to avoid intrusion into the internal 
network of the aircraft. The inter patch network is focused 
heavily on secure radio resource management using 
multidimensional physical and MAC layer diversity 
(retransmission control), as well as MIMO allocation. 
Other functionalities in this inter-patch network are 
troubleshooting, energy management, flow state 
estimation, and actuation control. 
The functionalities in L1 are mainly focused on the 
scheduling of traffic of the AFC system into the internal 
commercial real-time network of the aircraft (using the 
standard ARINC 664). Other functionalities include the 
following: quality of service control, flow management, 
secure encryption, traffic analysis to avoid malware 
intrusion, etc. The Bubble gateway has upper layer 
functionalities of routing in the internet, sensor data 
fusion, actuation control/update, sensor node 
virtualization, tunnelling, authentication of external users, 
key distribution, intra AFC system management, traffic 
control, dependability insurance mechanisms for real time 
internal networks, device management, etc.  Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL) is one of the options in evaluation to 
be implemented at the L1 and L2 network levels of the 
aeronautics architecture. An extension of the concept of 
virtual link (VL) used in the standard ARINC 664 is also 
under consideration to be used in the wireless domain.  
Other associated functionalities to the AFC use case are 
aircraft collision avoidance using the technology TCAS 
(Traffic collision avoidance). This refers to the high-level 
application domain of secure wireless avionics intra 
communications. The model can also be extended to other 
structure health monitoring (SHM)-like applications for 
the aircraft.  More details are shown in Figure 7, where 
some of the interfaces are still under study (TBD- to be 
defined). The functional view of the reference architecture 
defines several interfaces between layers as follows:  
6.1   Interface DL-NL  
The network layer requests the services from the device 
layer implemented in the patches and the MAC-PHY 
technology used for the inter-patch communication. The 
NL is in charge of routing in the network of patches, IP 
address identification, interoperability with the internal 
network of the airplane via scheduling, and traffic control. 
The network layer has also the objective to have a load 
balance in all the possible AFC networks across the plane, 
and the matching between the deadlines of the wireline 
and wireless network. This interface can also host some 
security functionalities based on IP technology such as 
IPSEC, tunnelling, secure sockets layer, etc.  
6.2   Interface NL-SL 
The service layer requests the network layer with the 
flows of the different patches and wireless networks 
aggregates of the active flow control system. It is in 
charge of organizing all the collection of sensor 
information across the different wireless networks of 
patches, processing and correcting errors. Intrusion 
identification is possible by matching the statistics of 
different networks and comparing to established margins 
of values. There is also the possibility to detected 
interference and jammers. Error of the boundary layer 
tracking or estimation of lift off forces can be used as 
metrics to estimate malfunction or potential attacks.  
6.3   Interface SL-IOTL  
The IoT layer allows airliner operator to gather data from 
aircraft. Authentication of credential of operators, as well 
as rules for privacy management for integrity or exposure 
can be implemented in this interface mechanism. 
6.4   Interface IOTL-CAL  
This interface aims to provide the data of one aircraft to 
the cloud computing facilities that will calculate optimum 
actuation policies using the data from different aircraft, 
airliners and potentially different routes. This will allow 
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6.5   Interface DL-CLM  
The main mechanisms for security control in the AFC 
system are foreseen to be implemented in the MAC-PHY 
layer. The cross-layer management aims to use this 
information to improve system performance in different 
layers. Channel conditions can be used indirectly to 
estimate flow states and provide redundancy to the sensor 
information. They can also be used to authenticate, 
manage and troubleshoot different patches.  
6.6   Interface DL-SLM  
This interface focuses on the multi-layer security interface 
with the device layer. Examples of this interface allow 
MAC-PHY algorithms to identify jammers or directions 
of eavesdroppers. Node identification using direction of 
arrival or statistical signal processing are also possible. 
Redundancy of source and channel coding can be used.  
6.7   Interface NL-CLM  
In this interface the network layer provides information to 
cross-layer optimization algorithms, Routes, Addresses, 
traffic state, quality of service, etc. are some of the 
metrics and information that can be requested through this 
interface. 
6.8   Interface NL-SLM 
The network layer interacts with the security layer 
management via a set of specific protocols. Tunnelling, 
virtual links, security layers, etc. are examples of specific 
implementations of this interface. In the aeronautics use 
case there is no expected usage of this interface. 
7   Vulnerability and attack model(s) 
Vulnerability and attack models are being developed for 
different layers of the aeronautics architecture. A useful 
reference model used in the SCOTT reference 
architecture and across the literature of security of IT 
systems (Common Criteria) is displayed in Figure 8. The 
important aspect from this framework is to identify the 
main asset, the associated vulnerability, and potential 
threats(s). From this information it is possible to define 
the actions that the stakeholders are willing to implement 
to reduce risk. The following tables show the 
vulnerabilities identified so far and potential solutions.  
, Table 2, and Table 3 present the vulnerabilities and 
potential solutions for L0, L1, and L2 layers, respectively. 
The tables follow the functional model of the SCOTT 
reference Architecture.  
 
Figure 8 The Common criteria conceptual model for security 
 
Table 1: Vulnerabilities, threats and solutions AFC  L0 
Layer Vulnerabilities Potential solutions 
CAL N/A N/A 
IOTL N/A N/A 
SL DDoS Packet analysis, authentication 
NL DoS, spoofing, MiM Authentication, encryption,  
DL Jamming, eavesdropping, 
collision, Integrity. 




Table 2: Vulnerabilities, threats and solutions AFC  L1 
Layer Vulnerabilities Potential solutions 
CAL Spoofing, Identity 
theft 
 
IOTL DoS, latency issues  
SL Replay attack  
NL DoS, spoofing, MIM Authentication, encryption, 
DL Interference, 
congestion, spoofing 
MIMO, scheduling, traffic shaping, 
authentication, PHY-layer assisted 
control and sensor aggregation 
Table 3: Vulnerabilities, threats and solutions AFC L2 
layer Vulnerabilities Potential solutions 
CAL Data integrity, lack of 




IOTL DoS, latency issues  
SL Replay attack Firewall L3, tunnelling, Key 
distribution 
NL DoS, MiM Authentication, encryption, 
DL Spoofing PHY-layer assisted control 
and sensor aggregation, 
authentication 
Figure 9 shows the loop of actuation control and the 
potential security issues that can be found along that loop 
and the entities involved in the process of the aeronautics 
use case. The intra-patch technology can be subject to 
software and hardware malfunctions, hacking attacks that 
take over the control of some patches operating system or 
transmission units. Some software verification, safe-mode 
operation, or firewalls can be used to avoid these 
problems inside the patch. The patches aim to reliably 
collect information of the state of the flow, and also 
implement the optimum actuation policy with the lowest 
delay to reduce risks of incorrect operations, or instability 
of the aircraft. It has been identified in previous 
deliverables that attacks such as denial of service or 
jamming that can completely disable the AFC system are 
not the most serious types of threats, provided the system 
is identified as unavailable. The most serious threats in 
the AFC case is when the information collected by the 
patch has been mismanaged or that its integrity is lost due 
to man in the middle, spoofing or replay attacks. This 
means that the control logic of the AFC system will 
decide actuation policies that are incorrect and therefore 
will affect the efficiency of the system in terms of loss of 
lift off forces, reduced efficiency in skin drag reduction, 
and eventually in fuel consumption increase, reduced 
range, payload capacity or aircraft speed. Therefore, 
particular attention will be placed on attacks where the 
data integrity of the sensors or the loop to disseminate 
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patches, MIMO (multiple input multiple output) will be 
used to construct an efficient way to manage the wireless 
transmissions to reduce risks of eavesdropping attacks, 
counteract jamming, identify compromised patches, 
authenticate and authorize spatially-based transmissions, 
and provide redundancy to the measurements of the state 
of the flow aggregated from al the patches across the 
airplane.  
 
Figure 9   Security analysis of the ACF use case 
Currently four attacks and security solutions are being 
considered in this use case. An interference jamming 
attack model is being considered using direction of arrival 
detection, higher layer detection using statistical tools or a 
simple passive footprint stochastic geometry model to 
reduce the potential attacks from pre-established 
directions in the aircraft.  This information about the 
attacker, either active or passive is used in the adaptation, 
retransmission control, MIMO resource allocation or 
beamforming solution. These processes are illustrated in 
Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10   Interference attack model and countermeasure 
Eavesdropping is a passive attack common in wireless 
applications. When using MIMO to manage the 
information transmitted in different spatial direction, it is 
possible to deal simultaneously with the reduction of 
interference and the leakage of information to insecure 
directions where eavesdropper might be detected or where 
there is a high risk. The model is shown in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11   Eavesdropping attack model and 
countermeasure 
Intrusion attack can lead patches to have incorrect or 
undesirable behaviour, producing data or incorrect 
feedback to the loop control. Mechanisms are being 
developed to provide redundancy about the flow state 
sensed by different patches. These mechanisms are based 
on a combination of physical MAC and higher layer 
reasoning processes. The idea is to detect patches that 
have been compromised and adapt all the network to 
reduce the influence of a compromised patch. The process 
is shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12   Intrusion attack and countermeasure model 
Higher layer attacks are also being considered. A denial 
of service attack (see Figure 13) can be launched in the 
internal network of the aircraft, producing the lack of 
contact of the patches with the control unit on board the 
plane. Different approaches are being considered to 
address this issue, for example the triggering of an 
autonomous operation by the network of patches, 
distributed decision making, etc.  
 
 
Figure 13   DoS attack and proposed countermeasure model 
Conclusions 
This paper has presented the architecture of the 
aeronautics use case for secure WAICs. Interface, 
objectives, requirements and preliminary vulnerability 
and security analysis have been conducted. The 
aeronautics industry will benefit from a detailed security 
analysis of interfaces in the context of modern IoT 
systems and architectures. SCOTT expects to cover 
several aspects in the coming years.  
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